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Valuing Wildlands 
Holmes Rolston, III* 
Valuing wildlands is complex. (1) In a philosophically oriented analysis, I distin-
guish seven meaning levels of value, individual preference, market price, individual 
good, social preference, social good, organismic, and ecosystemic, and itemize 
twelve types of value carried by wildlands, economic, life support, recreational, 
scientific, genetic diversity, aesthetic, cultural symbolization, historical, character 
building, therapeutic, religious, and intrinsic. (2) I criticize contingent valuation 
efforts to price these values. (3) I then propose an axiological model, which 
interrelates the multiple levels and types of value, and some principles for wildland 
management policy. 
About 2 percent of the contiguous U.S. is wilderness (1.2 percent designated; 1 
percent under study); 98 percent is developed, farmed, grazed, timbered, desig-
nated for multiple use. Another 2 percent might be suitable for wilderness or 
semiwild status—cut-over forests that have reverted to wilderness or areas as yet 
little developed. Decisions are being made about how to value these relict wild-
lands. Since they are almost entirely public lands, these are political decisions; but 
they are also taking place in the midst of a philosophical reassessment, coupled 
with ecological concerns, about how humans should value nature. They are 
political decisions entwined with reforming world views. 
Since these are public land use decisions about wild nature, there is a tendency 
to think that the most useful principles and strategies are likely to be economic: that 
the nearest thing to an adequate theory of "resource use" is going to involve an 
estimate of benefits over costs in dollars; that wise use will be "efficient" use. 
Decisions ought to be democratic, since they are political and about public lands, 
but pitfalls in the democratic process are many. Those with political clout and 
savvy, those with concentrated high-order interests, a lot to gain or lose, outshout 
or outmanipulate the disorganized majority whose interests are diffuse and low-
leveled. Organized small groups typically outact large latent groups; legislators 
react to pressure groups and defend their own interests. Agencies grow bureaucratic 
and sluggish; citizen preferences are difficult to register and aggregate; voters 
never have the options they prefer presented at the ballot box; and so on.  One way 
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to minimize these pitfalls is to insist on a decision analysis which is more 
systematic, more scientific, which often means, more economic. 
While it is widely recognized that some "amenity values" or "environmental 
values" are recalcitrant to quantification in dollars or other units, nevertheless, the 
effort to see how far cost-benefit analysis introduces some sense of order into an 
otherwise sprawling dispute over values continues. Legislators and government 
professionals are always sensitive to the charge of misusing public funds and 
resources, and if they can make economically based wildland decisions, they think 
that their decisions will then be as nearly scientific and democratic as can be. They 
believe that one sure route into human caring is by pricing, not in all cases, but 
routinely in matters of resource use. Some consideration of the just distribution of 
such costs and benefits will be needed, but that can come later. Initially, they say, 
an economic assessment of what these relict wildlands are worth is all that is 
required. 
In the discussion to follow I challenge this strategy. My discussion is not a 
criticism of the utility of cost-benefit analysis, only an inquiry into whether the 
sorts of values to be protected on relict wildlands can be captured in economic 
terms. In section one I outline seven levels of value, applicable independently of 
wildland decisions, followed by twelve types of value associated with wildland 
use. In section two I question whether efforts to register these values in monetary 
terms succeed. In section three I suggest several philosophical principles which 
might improve wildland decisions. Section one is descriptive; section two is 
critical; section three is partisan; all sections are analytic. 
I. A TAXONOMY OF VALUES 
In the taxonomic levels and types narrated here, there is no reason to think of 
mutually exclusive categories, but there is every reason to think of identifiable 
dimensions of value that need to be factored into any complete analysis. 
MEANING LEVELS OF VALUE 
(1) Valuejp = individual preference value. Value ip is what individuals prefer in 
contexts of choice. Valuing and its product, value, lie in the experience of interest 
satisfaction. In this sense valuing is subjective—valuing brings value into being 
within subject-owners, typically in their relationship to the world. Mere objects, 
including organisms that have no psychological life, no felt preferences, can have 
no individual preference value, though they may be resources for preferences. In 
our private case, for normal adults, what we ourselves prefer is reasonably evident 
from introspection coupled with action. The valuesip of others can be known from 
verbal preferences and behaviors, although some situations compel discrepancies 
between attitude and action.  Where there are constraints, it may be difficult to 
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ferret out true values. We also have to separate goals from failed performances, 
latent from manifest preferences, etc. Valueip has seemed to many to be the motor 
force of all value, from which all the rest are derived. 
(2) Valuemp = market price. Often an illuminating way out of the subjectivity of 
valueip is to look to the market, which, though produced by valueip, has empirical 
objectivity. Articles and services are regularly exchanged on the market, which in 
nonbarter societies invests them with a going price, a public, observable quantity, 
resulting from many individuals estimating the worth of having these commod- 
ities. Valuemp is a derivative of usefulness, rarity, labor, advertising, government 
regulation, etc., but in the end things are traded instrumentally to satisfy human 
interests, and their price must reflect preferences. If no one desired these things, 
the market would collapse. In wild nature, no monetary or barter economy exists, 
but humans, nevertheless, buy and sell natural things incessantly. They labor, 
trade, and own property, using nature for interest satisfactions, and this brings 
wild nature into the economic sphere. 
(3) Valueig = individual good value. If valuing is just preferring, one can hardly 
make mistakes about what one has valued, any more than one can be mistaken 
about having made a target of something, though mistakes abound with regard to 
whether what is preferred really brings satisfaction. We can make choices and 
purchases that are not in our best interest, not really. They bring momentary 
goods, or none at all, and soon leave us worse than before. Valueig is what is in a 
person's interest, whether or not the individual chooses it. Preferences need to be 
constantly revised accordingly in terms of it. There is something raw about 
untutored preferences; individuals need education (even perfect knowledge) be 
fore they can competently say what (all) their goods are. Many things happen 
(such as the rain) which are of value whether we welcome them or not. Biological 
processes (photosynthesis) are vital even in our ignorance of them. Valuesig may 
not involve exercising preferences, much less marketing. 
(4) Valuesp = social preference value. Through politics, ethics, religion, etc., 
individuals express a social will, often conflicting with some particular wills. 
Valuesp is what a society prefers when optionally allocating its time, resources, 
skills, energy, and money. Values characterize groups, not just individuals. 
Valuesp, a social trait, represents some amalgamating of valueip, a psychological 
trait, though it is not clear how this does, or should, take place. Sociologists debate 
whether there is any social whole above the individual person-parts who compose 
it. Society itself has no center of experiences; only individuals do. Society is not 
capable of interest satisfactions; it enjoys no pleasures, suffers no pains. Such 
considerations lead many to claim that valuesp is some kind of fiction, a pragmatic 
operational concept (like a center of gravity) which is only apparent. Still, some 
social preferences seem to serve society at large, beyond the fact that, or regardless 
of whether, they satisfy individual interests. Social preferences, unless oppres- 
sive, seem to command more importance than particular individual preferences. 
At least they are relatively more enduring. 
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(5) Valuesg = social good value. Society can err about what contributes to its 
well-being. Social choices too can be out of touch with reality. Further, given the 
prevailing pluralism, a negotiated consensus of valuessp is likely not to be consis- 
tent. Even if only individuals have a well-being (society being an aggregate of 
related individuals), at least society functions and dysfunctions. The vague, 
beguiling slogan, "the greatest good for the greatest number," can mean "what 
most prefer on average" (valuesp) but usually means "what is on average functional 
in society" (valuesg). Part of the worth of a practice is whether it keeps society 
functioning smoothly, regardless of whether this agrees with the corporate will. 
The "open space" of the Indian Peaks Wilderness serves as a pressure release valve 
for the Denver-Boulder metropolitan area, and it might be more functional for 
Colorado society to maintain it so, even though the legislature voiced a preference, 
reflecting polls, that federal managers log the area for jobs and firewood. 
(6) Valueor =  organismic value. Value is not just an economic, psychological, 
social, and political word, but also a biological one. Valueor is what is good for an 
organism, and all preferences and goods of humans are really subsets of this more 
comprehensive notion. Various instrumental organic and environmental goods 
contribute to an organism's well-being, and that well-being is for the organism a 
telic end state, an intrinsic value, not always a felt preference. Survival value, lies 
at the core of evolutionary adaptation. Genetic information is of high organismic 
value, but has no necessary connection with sentience, experience, preference 
satisfactions, or markets. Wild creatures defend their lives as if they had goods of 
their own. An organism grows, repairs its wounds, resists death, and reproduces. 
Every genetic set is in this sense a (nonmoral) normative set, proposing what ought 
to be beyond what is. At this level, wild nature is a place of values prior to human 
decisions, and one thing the reforming world view asks is whether any concern for 
wild organismic value limits human decisions about land use. 
(7) Valuees = ecosystemic value. Like persons in society, organisms live in 
ecosystems, with a parallel between the good of the system and that of the 
individual. Persons are good in the roles they serve—mothers, wildlife biologists. 
Organisms fill niches and sustain a flourishing system, though not intentionally, 
perhaps unwillingly. Songbirds, which have intrinsic valueor in themselves, have 
instrumental value regulating insect populations. Ecologists too (coached by 
sociologists?) have doubted whether ecosystems exist as anything over their 
component parts.  Valuees is even more convincingly a kind of fiction than valuesg, 
because in ecosystems there are no policy makers, no social wills, no goals. 
Though the ecosystem can seem more biologically real than the social system, it 
less evidently has a locus of value. Nevertheless, in some way that we poorly 
understand, some creativity (accidental or not) in the evolutionary ecosystem has 
formed all its organic species and processes, and we as humans are now much 
concerned with keeping these ecosystems running as they do. Some events can be 
better, some worse for the integrity of a biological community, as in the choice for 
a biodegradable pesticide. 
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TYPES OF WILDLAND VALUES 
(1) Market value. Wildland products have valuemp. Individuals valueip them, a 
use expressed in the social will, valuesp. The goods of individuals and society are 
thereby increased. Nature can be used instrumentally to render human existence 
more materially comfortable. Humans have no options about some consumption 
of nature in our economy, but we have options concerning how much. Until 
recently, especially in the vast undeveloped New World, nature seemed an almost 
unending resource. By an increasingly competent use of natural resources our 
economy could grow forever. Lately, however, in a revising world view, we are 
decreasingly confident about the myth of inexhaustible resources. We seek renew 
able resource use, or expect rationing of nonrenewable resources, perhaps because 
of rising valuemp, and hope for substitutes. Growth pressures have increasingly 
forced market values into competition with all those values to which we next turn. 
(2) Life support value. So far as culture is entwined with ecosystems, our 
choices (valueip, valuesp) need to be within the capacities of biological systems, 
paying some attention to valuees. But the latter are not values that go on in the 
human mind. The central goods of the biosphere were in place before humans 
arrived, though they have lately become our resources. Further, such things as air 
flow, water circulation, sunshine, nitrogen-fixation have never figured much in 
market prices, individual preferences, or collective choices. They were just 
natural givens which supported everything else. Lately, however, the scope of 
human activity has increasingly threatened crucial life support functions (soil 
depth, the ozone layer, groundwater purity). One reason for managing wildlands 
with care is that their cumulative impact on hydrologic cycles, photosynthesis, 
biomass decomposition, insect regulation, and pollution scrubbing is consider 
able. Another is that we want to know what the unmolested system was in order to 
fit ourselves more intelligently in with its operations when we do alter it. 
(3) Recreational value. Wildlands have two kinds of positive recreational 
value. We want (a) to see what we can do (activity) and (b) to be let in on nature's 
show (contemplation). Wildlands are valuedip for sports (fishing, skiing) that 
demonstrate skills in the challenge of the wild. Nevertheless, people also enjoy 
watching wildlife and landscapes with the focus on nature as a wonderland, a rich 
evolutionary ecosystem where truth is stranger than fiction. There are trails to be 
hiked, a rare bird or fern to be admired, or just a hypnotic vortex below a waterfall 
to capture our attention. The continuing existence of an outdoor gymnasium and 
theatre is valued by two-thirds of Americans, especially by the young and edu- 
cated, as a matter of preference and well-being. There is even a push-pull effect. 
Not only are persons drawn to the wildland, they escape to it, driven from the city. 
Wildlands absorb a kind of urban negative disvalue, a tandem effect. 
(4) Scientific value. Nature is a laboratory for the pursuit of science, good not 
just because individuals like it (valueip), but because society gains pure knowl- 
edge, which enlarges our understanding of the world and our roles in it, and gains 
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better applied science, which enables us to manage and rebuild our environments 
(valuesg). These benefits to "science" are vaguer than economic or recreational 
benefits, where the affected citizens can be easily identified. They do not belong 
merely to Americans but rather enter the global culture. Although it is hard to say 
whether they are individual or social, they are not minor. The most juvenile natural 
science is ecology; the least known level of organization is the mosaic of com-
munities that compose a biome. We have no theory of evolution at the ecosystemic 
level; biologists are divided over whether interspecific competition is a minimal or 
a major force in evolution; indeed we are not very clear on what the natural 
successions are over a few hundred years. Relict wildlands are the only places 
where these disputes can be settled. Destroying wildlands is like burning unread 
books. 
(5) Genetic diversity value. Humans eat remarkably few plants in any volume 
(about thirty), and still remarkably fewer come from North America (one or two). 
With the loss of fifteen cultivars, half the world would starve. Ten species provide 
80 percent of the world's calories. Given increasing pressures from agriculture 
(monocultures, pesticides, herbicides, hybridized strains, groundwater pollu- 
tion), given increased mutation rates from radioactivity, the nuclear threat, exotic 
blights, it seems important to preserve the genetic reservoir naturally selected 
here, just in case we need to crossbreed against such microorganisms as produced 
the corn blight of 1970, or to turn to food stocks adapted to North American 
habitats. Such resources, presently unknown, cannot be well protected ex situ (in 
zoos, seed depositories), but only in situ by preserving natural ecosystems. Nor 
can laboratory genetic recombinations substitute for wildlands; we need natural 
diversity for the startpoint materials. 
(6) Aesthetic value. Nature's problem solving yields works of grace—an eagle 
soaring, a snake slithering, a coyote on the run, the fiddleheads of ferns, even mud 
flats with the 120-degree stress fracture symmetries. On small scales and large, 
both ensemble and individual, nature's patterns can please the eye. Further, the 
sense of abyss overlooking a gorge is aesthetic, as is the eerie chill when, nearing a 
stormy summit, one's hair stands on end in the charged air. So also is the thought 
that in one cone lies a possible forest. All are experiences unlikely to be had in the 
Metropolitan Museum. We do not need to settle whether or how far beauty is in the 
eye of the beholder; it is enough that such experiences come. But we do need to 
notice that sensitivity to this value takes an educated eye. Plain places (as may be 
judged swamps and flatlands) have a coherence and completeness of which plain 
persons never dream. Here, familiarity breeds no contempt. Valuing wildlands is 
vastly more than soaking up scenery, as one travels slowly in intimate contact with 
the environment. 
(7) Cultural symbolization value. The bald eagle symbolizes national self- 
images and aspirations (freedom, strength, beauty), as does the bighorn ram, a 
"state animal" for Coloradoans. The pasqueflower is the state flower of South 
Spring 1985 VALUING WILDLANDS 29 
Dakota; the alligator a symbol for Florida. Natural areas enter local cultural 
moods—Grandfather Mountain in western North Carolina; Natural Bridge and the 
Shenandoah in central Virginia. Horsetooth Mountain, overlooking the city, 
provides the logo for Fort Collins, Colorado. Culture commingles with landscape 
and wildlife in places named after geomorphic, faunal, or floral features: Tinkling 
Springs, Fox Hollow, Aspen, Crested Butte. We want some wildness preserved 
because it comes to express the values of the culture superimposed on it, entering 
our sense of belongingness and identity. This involves valueip, but even more 
valuesp,sg. What would be the impact on American hopes if the bald eagle became 
extinct? On the perceived quality of Colorado life with the death of the last 
bighorn? 
(8) Historical value. Wildlands provide historical value in two ways, cultural 
and natural. America has a recent heritage of self-development against a diverse 
and challenging environment, seen in pioneer, frontiersman, and cowboy motifs. 
Forests, prairies, and ranges ought to be preserved as souvenir places for each 
generation's learning (however secondarily, playfully, or critically) of our fore 
fathers' moods, learned there quite as much as in the Minuteman Historical Park. 
They provide a lingering echo of what we once were, of a way we once passed. 
There is nothing like the howl of a wolf to resurrect the ghost of Jim Bridger. A 
wilderness trip mixes the romance and the reality of the past in present experience, 
lifting historical experience out of books and recapturing it on a vivid landscape. 
But wildlands also provide the profoundest historical museum of all, a relic of the 
way the world was in 99.99 percent of past time. We are relics of that world, and 
that world, as a tangible relic in our midst, contributes to our sense of duration, 
antiquity, continuity, and identity. We passed that way once too. 
(9) Character building value. Wildlands are used by organizations that educate 
character—Boy and Girl Scouts, Outward Bound, and church camps. Similar 
growth also occurs in individuals independently of formal organizations. What is 
valued is the challenge of self-competence, in teamwork or alone, with reflection 
over skills acquired and one's place under the sun. Wildlands provide a place to 
sweat, to push yourself more than usual, perhaps to let the adrenalin flow. They 
provide a place to take calculated risks, to learn the luck of the weather, to lose and 
find one's way, to reminisce over success and failure. They teach one to care about 
his or her physical condition. They provide a place to gain humility and a sense of 
proportion. Such growth experiences can be sought (valueip), as with the goose 
pimples and quickened pulse of the first solo backpack. They can also be unsought 
and even traumatic (caught in a storm, injured or ill in a remote location). Still, 
integrated into character, they increase well-being (valueig), and the social good 
(valuesg) is benefited by having such citizens. 
(10) Therapeutic value. An entirely normal use of wildlands, reported by a 
majority, is for semi-therapeutic recreation. A minority use, less well explored, is 
as a setting to treat psychologically disturbed persons. For the mentally ill, the 
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ambiguity and complexity in culture can be disorienting. It is hard to discriminate 
friends, enemies, and the indifferent, hard to get resolve focused on what to do 
next, or to predict the consequences of delay. But in the wilds supper has to be 
cooked; one needs firewood. And it is getting dark. Exertion is demanded 
unambiguously; accomplishment is evident in a low-frustration environment. The 
self is starkly present and the protocol is simpler. One really is on his or her own; 
one's friends are few and he or she utterly depends on them. All this can mobilize 
the disturbed for personal recovery. So far as humans have been selected over the 
evolutionary course to need challenge, adventure, exertion, and risk, society must 
provide avenues for such archetypal emotions, or expect deviant behavior—gangs 
and rebels without a cause. Wildness may provide a "niche" that meets deep-
seated psychosomatic needs. 
(11) Religious value. The wilderness works on a traveler's soul, as well as on 
muscles and character. Mountaintop experiences, sunsets, canyon strata, or a 
meadow of dogstooth violets can generate experiences of "a motion and a spirit, 
that impels . . . and rolls through all things."1 Wildlands thus become something 
like sacred texts. Whether in the majority or minority, the rights of such "users" 
are to be protected. For wilderness purists intensely, and for most persons 
occasionally, wildlands provide a cathedral setting. The wilderness elicits cosmic 
questions, differently from town. Some of the most moving experiences attainable 
are to be had there. Those who do not attend religious services can value nature 
more than those who do. Church leaves them cold; they are pantheists or non- 
ecclesiastical monotheists. They have a diffuse naturalistic religion, not a super- 
naturalistic creedal one. They do not like indoor liturgies, but prefer outdoor awe, 
solitude, vastness. Since the constitution protects religious freedom, so far as 
wildlands are essential for or facilitate this, they need preserving. 
(12) Intrinsic natural value. Each preceding type makes nature tributary to 
human experiences, but several hint at more. They recall how, on the concluding 
two levels, wild organisms have goods of their own (valueor), how they are 
selected (blindly, but nevertheless effectively) as good fits in their environments, 
so that a spontaneous ecosystem is typically healthy (valuees). All this occurs 
premorally, but when humans appear with their reflective consciences, do they 
have some duties toward these storied natural achievements? Typically such 
convictions mix a derivative anthropocentric prudence (recreation, genetic vulner- 
ability) with an ethical concern, often inarticulate, that grizzly bears, pileated 
woodpeckers, even wildernesses, have a right to continued existence for what they 
are in themselves as neighbors and wonderlands on Earth. Two-thirds of Amer- 
icans doubt whether humans ought intentionally to destroy endangered species or 
rare environments. Diffuse but deeply felt, such values are difficult to bring into 
decisions; nevertheless, it does not follow that they ought to be ignored. 
 
    1 William Wordsworth, "Lines Composed a Few Miles above Tintern Abbey" (1798). 
Spring 1985 VALUING WILDLANDS 31 
II. CONTINGENT VALUATION OF WILDLANDS 
Can the preceding array of value levels and types be reduced, wholly or in part, 
to economic terms, as a prerequisite for a cost-benefit analysis? J. V. Krutilla and 
A. C. Fisher noticed the difficulty and suggested some categories. "In confronting 
the need to evaluate preservation benefits, we find that there are a number of 
aspects of such benefits that we do not know how to estimate quantitatively. These 
are the value of natural environments that have remarkable qualities for scientific 
research; the value that individuals place on retaining an option when faced with 
actions having irreversible consequences; and the value that some individuals 
place on the knowledge of the mere existence of the gifts of nature, even when they 
feel certain they will never have or choose an opportunity to experience them in 
situ."2 
Taking up the challenge, there have been a number of proposals to make 
economic estimates of various wildland values, typically (1) scenic value, (2) 
recreational value, (3) option value, (4) existence value, and (5) bequest value.3 
Option value is the value of retaining options that a set of natural entities, 
threatened with erosion or destruction by development, provides now and hence-
forth to a prospective user. Existence value, separable from option value, is the 
satisfaction to an individual of just knowing that the wild set exists, even if 
unvisited by himself (or others?). Bequest value, thought also separable, is the 
value that an individual places on bequeathing a wilderness to children and future 
generations. 
    2 J. V. Krutilla and A. C. Fisher, The Economics of Natural Environments (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1975), p. 124; J. V. Krutilla, "Conservation Reconsidered," American 
Economic Review 57 (1967): 777-86. 
3 For contingent valuation of aesthetic, scenic visibility, see: Alan Randall, Berry C. Ives, and 
Clyde Eastman, "Bidding Games for Valuation of Aesthetic Environmental Improvements," Journal 
of Environmental Economics and Management 1 (1974): 132-49; Alan Randall, Berry C. Ives, and 
Clyde Eastman, Benefits of Abating Aesthetic Environmental Damage from the Four Corners Power 
Plant, Fruitland, New Mexico, New Mexico State University Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin 
618 (Las Cruces, 1974); David S. Brookshire, Berry C. Ives, and William D. Schulze, "The Valuation 
of Aesthetic Preferences,'* Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 3 (1976): 325-46; 
R. D. Rowe, Ralph C. d'Arge, and D. S. Brookshire, "An Experiment on the Economic Value of 
Visibility," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 1 (1980): 1-19. For contingent 
valuation of wildlife experiences see: Judd Hammack and Gardner Mallard Brown, Jr., Waterfowl and 
Wetlands: Toward Bioeconomic Analysis (Washington, D.C: Resources for the Future, 1974); David 
S. Brookshire, Alan Randall, and John R, Stoll, "Valuing Increments and Decrements in Natural 
Resource Service Flows," American Journal of Agricultural Economics 62 (1980): 478-88; David 
Brookshire, Alan Randall, et al., Methodological Experiments in Valuing Wildlife Resources: Phase I 
Interim Report to the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, 1977. For contingent valuation of option, 
existence, and bequest value in wilderness preservation see: Richard G. Walsh, John B. Loomis, and 
Richard A. Gillman, "Valuing Option, Existence, and Bequest Demands for Wilderness," Land 
Economics 60 (1984): 14-29. For a sensitive overview, cautiously advocating contingent valuation, 
see: William D. Schulze, Ralph C. d'Arge, and David S. Brookshire, "Valuing Environmental 
Commodities: Some Recent Experiments," Land Economics 57 (1981): 151-72. See also George L. 
Peterson and Alan Randall, eds., Valuation of Wildland Benefits (Boulder, Colo.: Westview 
Press, 1984). 
32 ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS Vol. 7 
The most plausible of the five to be measured economically is recreational 
value. Recreation is sold elsewhere on the market and can perhaps be shadow 
priced. Though wilderness experience is unsold, it costs something—gas, meals, 
lodging enroute, fishing licenses, gear (?), campground fees. Access costs are 
typically $10-15 per day. Does this represent the value of the visit? Difficulties 
arise. Wilderness is a free good provided by Mother Nature, like fresh air and 
sunshine. Wilderness is a nonmarket service provided by governments, like the 
military and public schools. The wilderness experience is an atypical recreational 
experience and what the user actually spends poorly reflects its value. 
To overcome this difficulty, contingent valuation is proposed. We can discover 
what users would be willing to pay. "The applicable rule to follow. . .  is to use that 
procedure which appears to provide the best measure or expression of willingness 
to pay by the actual consumer of the recreation good or service."4 "Techniques of 
benefit estimation have been developed sufficiently to make benefit-cost analysis 
fully applicable to appraisal of recreation alternatives on public forests. Willing-
ness of users to pay is the appropriate way to measure benefits, and can be 
estimated from either the participation behavior of recreation users or by surveying 
a sample of participants to learn their preferences."5 From what the users (think 
they) are willing to pay, we now subtract access costs for the net benefit supplied 
by the government, the "consumer's surplus," a valueip received but not paid for.6 
Aggregated over multiple visits and visitors, the total renders objective the 
otherwise subjective (though real) wildland recreational value, which can be 
compared with timber sales. 
This is imaginary money, which the users pay no one and which also does not 
remain in their pockets. Still it might provide a reliable estimate, provided the user 
has a congenial context of judgment. But on wildlands there is little reason to ask 
willingness to pay except under the shadow of protecting wildlands from alterna-
tive uses, and in this context the answer becomes a competitive bid. Rather ill-
defined, it is something akin to a proposal that we take from them what they 
have had by tradition, public benefit, or right, and then ask what they are willing to 
pay to defend it. The precise status of any "right" to recreation, scenic views, open 
space, wildlife encounters, religious experiences (all integrated with recreation) 
   4 U. S. Water Resources Council, "Principles and Strategies for Planning Water and Related Land 
Resources "Federal Register 38, no. 174 (10 September 1973): 24,778-866, citation on p. 24,804; U. 
S. Water Resources Council, Procedures for Evaluation of National Economic Development (NED) 
Benefits and Costs in Water Resources Planning, Subpart K, Recreation, Federal Register 44, no. 242, 
(14 December 1979): 72, 950-65. 
3 J. F. Dwyer and M. D. Bowes, "Benefit-Cost Analysis for Appraisal of Recreation Alternatives," 
Journal of Forestry 77, no. 3 (1979): 145-47, with comment by A. A. Dyer and J. G. Hof, 147-48, and 
vigorous discussion by others, Journal of Forestry 78, no. 1 (1980): 21-28. 
6 Consumer's surplus is "the maximum a consumer will pay for a given amount of a good, less the 
amount he actually pays" (E. J. Mishan, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Introduction [New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1971], p. 31). 
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on public lands is obscure, and, of course, developers also have "rights" on "lands 
of many uses." But citizens have long been told that these are "your national 
forests" (as the signs say on entry), which they are encouraged to use, managed by 
public servants whom (directly or indirectly) they have elected. They are wholly 
unaccustomed to paying to keep developers out; their presumptions are the other 
way round: that the developers who gain (and not the losers) ought to bear the full 
cost of what they remove from the public till. 
The better question might be what the users would accept in payment to give up 
their recreation. But now we are asking a quite unfamiliar question. Although it 
does presume a willing seller rather than a defender of a threatened good, the user 
is made the owner of a good—a unit of recreation (integrated with historical, 
cultural symbolization, or life support values)—that he is ill-adept at selling. It 
introduces a host of concerns (examined below) about whether a citizen can 
entertain the thought of selling, corporately with others, a public good for private 
gain, x dollars. The upshot is that in these surveys economists are unsure whether 
to ask willingness to pay or to accept payment. Even if they have theories about 
what should be the starting reference point, their survey respondents do not 
operate out of these theories. 
Clever respondents might bid or sell high to save the wilderness. (Or should 
they bid low to prevent entrance fees?) They could misrepresent to gain the 
outcomes they value. However, strategic scheming seems beyond most respon-
dents, and can (in part) be checked against by alternative questions that put all on a 
limited budget. A better grounded fear is of nonstrategic pricing. If they think their 
estimates are not going to set any policy, they will not care what they say, 
especially if busy or puzzled. They must not simply be preferring but helping to 
project what will take place. The incentive for being responsible is the same as that 
for bias. Even if earnest, one is being asked to price what one has little clear 
strategy for pricing. This is especially true in the package of up to a dozen goods, 
some of which (re-creation beyond recreation, aesthetic experience, religious 
experience, amateur scientific study, character building) make it difficult to 
differentiate recreational value in isolation from the rest. 
The difficulties are compounded if we try to price aesthetic value. (Is this a 
subset of, or something else than, recreational value?) "This is a national park, to 
be affected by a proposed coal-fired power plant nearby. How much additional 
entrance fee would you pay to have for thirty days a year (of relevant atmospheric 
conditions) a scenic visibility of 25,50,75 miles? What would you sell such views 
for?" This supposes that an individual in private trade might gain or sell a public 
good such as air quality or scenic vistas, more or less murky. It asks him to 
translate a good which is collective and nonmarket (scenery) into a good which is 
private and market (consumer dollars). It asks an individual to presume the right to 
sell (not only on his part but implicating others) what he thinks of as a nonexclu-
sive, nonrival public good. "This wilderness has coal under it. How much would 
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you pay (taxes, utility hikes?) not to lose x encounters with elk, coyotes, brown 
creepers?" (Is this an aesthetic value or respect for valueor mixed with valuees?) 
These questions suppose a voluntary exchange (power for scenery, dollars per 
wildlife encounter), but in fact the exchange will be individually involuntary; it 
will be an agency decision levied upon all. The sets of persons who lose the vistas 
and the wildlife are really quite different from the persons who gain the power or 
the operators who profit. 
The frequency of "infinity," "zero," or "not for sale" responses indicates that for 
many (up to half) the question is in one way or another off the map.7 Persons 
expect to pay for some good produced, an artifact or service, some material that 
has been or can be labored over. But here on wildlands there is no "producer" or 
"supplier" whom it seems right to compensate.8 No one has labored over anything, 
and why should anyone pay or be paid? In a way, the "victim-must-pay" inquiry is 
like paying to prevent the theft of a good one thought he had by democratic process 
or by gift of nature. It is something like paying for protection on the streets of 
Chicago, hardly a free market. It forces the user to be a consumer and compromis-
ing pragmatist in a decision context in which he ought to be a citizen, esthete, 
philosopher, and ethicist. 
The format allows no account of what the recreator thinks in the fuller dimen-
sions of his person about the larger benefits of public wildlands, free goods 
provided by nature and preserved by the government, about income constraints, 
the inequitable distribution of wealth, or the best things in life being free. The 
respondent is blinded to such considerations as the need for diverse options in 
recreation, rights of minority users, future trends, needs of future generations, 
intrinsic natural values, the psychological or social desirability or the quality of 
various forms of recreation. He must skip all historical, therapeutic, or cultural 
symbolization values. Already a victim who must estimate his willingness to 
pay to defend something he owns, the citizen is further victimized by the nar-
rowed context into which he must squeeze his preferences. Only dollar answers 
count. 
     If we try to press beyond recreational and scenic values to option, existence, and 
 
7 See I. M. Gordon and J. L. Knetsch, "Consumer's Surplus Measures and the Evaluation of 
Resources," Land Economics 55 (1979): 1-10; Randall, Ives, and Eastman, Benefits, pp. 19, 24; 
Shultze, d'Arge, and Brookshire, "Valuing Environmental Commodities," p. 166; Rowe, d'Arge, and 
Brookshire, "Experiment," p. 9. 
8 Subsidized public recreation is not at issue here. On-site wildland users may be enjoying benefits 
which have maintenance costs (upkeep of roads, trails, game supervision, ranger salaries) and which 
taxpayers at large are bearing, Questions about whether on-site recreators should bear more of the 
actual costs are plausibly subject to willingness-to-pay evaluation, although the lack of a realistic 
market context troubles answers here too. The unspecified mix of recreational with other benefits 
preserved on public lands (life support, genetic diversity), which taxpayers do enjoy, complicates the 
issue. But should-users-bear-the-maintenance-cost questions are conceptually different from willing 
ness to pay to prevent economic development, pollution, species extinctions, scenic despoliations, 
which impinge on recreational opportunities. 
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bequest values, the problems rapidly grow worse. While some economists caution 
that we do not know how to price these values, others suppose that here too 
willingness to pay is the appropriate measure. A Colorado household is willing to 
pay, on average, about $4.04 annual option value, $4.87 annual existence value, 
and $5.01 annual bequest value, for a total of $ 13.92 annually for 1.2 million acres 
of wilderness. This sum rises to $18.75 for 2.6 million acres ($5.44 option value, 
$6.56 existence value, $6.75 bequest value). For 5 million acres, the total 
willingness to pay is $25.30 ($7.34 option value, $8.86 existence value, $9.10 
bequest value). Multiplied by the number of Colorado households, we calculate 
the benefits to the state.9 But why not use willingness to sell here? Perhaps because 
no one could seriously imagine that compensation would be paid the sellers. In any 
case, what have such numbers measured? 
Such categories as existence, option, and bequest values promise to package up 
a fuzzy assortment (roughly the range of types 2-12, minus some recreation), but 
as values grow intangible, social and ecosystemic, the individual's capacity to 
price them becomes progressively poorer. All the problems met with in pricing 
recreational or scenic value return with a vengeance. As consumers, respondents 
are being asked to express their convictions in dollars about things over which they 
have no market experience, and dollars are, after all, units that have their everyday 
home in markets. Even as citizens voting in referendums they are accustomed to 
answer "Is-it-worth-it-in-dollars?" kinds of questions that have to do with the 
purchase of market materials and services (bombers, library books, real estate, 
building construction, man-hours of police time). They are unaccustomed to 
citizen "purchases" of genetic diversity, wildlife encounters, scenic vistas, or wild 
cultural symbols, especially on lands that the citizens already own and in situations 
where no money changes hands.10 
The respondent has never operated in any market vaguely resembling these 
kinds of goods. How do we price, for instance, "the value that some individuals 
place on the knowledge of the mere existence of the gifts of nature, even when they 
feel certain that they will never have or choose an opportunity to experience them 
 
   9  Walsh, Loomis, and Gillman, "Valuing Option, Existence, and Bequest Demands," p. 25. 
       10 Contingent valuation needs to be distinguished from citizens' referendums. In April 1981 
Larimer County, Colorado, citizens voted for a half cent sales tax over six months to purchase the 
Soderberg Ranch containing Horsetooth Mountain, on the skyline of Fort Collins. Following public 
debate, a local jurisdiction voted to use mutual coercion to buy something on the market, which they did 
not own, in order to preserve wild recreational, aesthetic, and cultural embodiment values. There is 
nothing hypothetical and nonmarket here, and no victim-must-pay-for-what-he-already-owns over- 
tones. They were buying a working ranch, with the owner using the proceeds to relocate, competing 
with offers from real estate developers. They were not separately bidding, but had a corporate target 
figure, translated into a tax, on which they were voting yes or no. That is a citizen choice using votes to 
allocate dollars. By contrast wildlands are already public lands, and citizens (if they so regard 
themselves as respondents) are being asked about a hypothetical willingness to pay to protect what they 
already own, with nothing traded that bears any relationship to actual markets. 
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in situ"?11 Since biological diversity, a value we are only learning to appreciate, is 
not something on the market, how can one price it? Does one include it somewhere 
within option, existence, or bequest values, or is it omitted in such a survey? Might 
it be that for $3.00 per person Americans will sell the whooping crane into 
extinction? Most respondents do not know how to resolve questions of extinction 
even within their own hierarchy of personal needs, much less to price these for 
social policy. Does it matter whether the respondent is ignorant about the intrica-
cies of the ecosystem he judges, whether the estimator of scientific value is a 
scientist? Even allowing, as economists often do, that some environmental values 
remain uncaught, how do we know which ones are left out and not confusedly 
stated somewhere in the dollar amounts for option, existence, and bequest values? 
It might first seem to help to cast the whole question into a citizens' rather than a 
consumers' orientation. Respondents are cautioned that they must not think of 
their replies as consumer purchases, despite the fact that their dollar figures go into 
cost-benefit equations, and even though a frequent economist's term for the value 
so captured is "consumers' surplus." They must think of them more like citizen 
votes, using dollars as a kind of proxy, indicating what they think citizens ought to 
pay for wildland benefits, comparably to the way they pay for law courts or 
military protection. The survey is a citizen's device only partly to cooperate with 
but more to counter the real market. Willingness to pay levied taxes will have more 
citizen orientation than individual entrance fees, purchasing a day's recreation, or 
utility hikes, consumer-style transactions. But the payment of extra taxes does 
nothing to eliminate the victim-must-pay distastefulness of the procedure. 
Willingness to pay becomes a kind of game, used not so much to imagine 
anything on a consumers' market as to elicit citizen choices, preferences stated in 
monetary amounts in order that these can be weighed into the equations, compet-
ing with alternate uses which do involve marketed goods. Despite appearances, 
we are not asking a "What's-it-worth-to-you-personally?" question, where each 
bids dollars depending on tastes and purchasing power. We are asking, "What's it 
worth to citizens on average, yourself included, in tax dollars, if all pay fairly 
proportioned amounts, and if all have the same nonconsumptive access to these 
public benefits that we cannot expect the market to supply?" In terms of the value 
level analysis, we are not asking a valuemp question, despite the dollar appearance 
of the answers, nor even a valueip or valueig question, but a valuesp and valuesg 
question. 
    11 Those who value the mere existence of wildlands, though they never expect to visit them, are 
often called "off-site users," a term revealing the utilitarian, anthropocentric coordinates of this 
value-mapping system, made worse by contingent valuations treating them as off-site consumers. Such 
categories lie in an alien reference frame from that of those trying to report convictions about intrinsic 
values in nature. "Off-site users" grotesquely illustrates the extent to which a non-negotiable paradigm 
("resource use") can be twisted to accommodate anomalous phenomena. It exactly reverses what those 
so categorized would say of themselves: that wildlands are valuable when left alone, apart from 
questions of human use. 
Spring 1985 VALUING WILDLANDS 37 
The difficulty now is that the question is not what it appears, and even if the 
respondent comes to understand the pretending involved, he has no rules by which 
he can translate valuesg into valuemp, none by which he can integrate value types 2-
12 on a scale commensurate with the market value of wildland products. The 
more he operates as a citizen, the more the privatized form of the question is 
remote from what he is really trying to indicate, and the less his capacity to do any 
pricing. He may also feel that he is being forced to play this game, in the sense that 
no answer eliminates his opinion, and wonder whether zero bids or infinity 
demands (or others that the interviewer considers out of range) will be eliminated 
on grounds of noncooperation. If a respondent states a huge sum (a recreator who 
personally places high religious value on wilderness experiences, a citizen who 
wishes to protect the rights of those who do, or an Earth citizen who holistically 
values ecosystems), will this make it into the cost-benefit equations, or be tossed 
out as a monkey-wrench answer? The citizen ought not in principle be asked to 
couple sufficient money with his nonmarket policy preferences; and when he is 
asked this, he does not in practice reliably know how to answer. 
The respondent has no idea how to do any calculations; yet on the basis of his 
guesstimates, economists do metric calculations, overly refining what are really 
raw data. All this number crunching creates the illusion of mathematical exacti-
tude covering up what were, to begin with, iffy replies in a cramped hypothetical 
context. Nor is the use of the respondent's behavior to correct verbal misjudg-
ments of willingness to pay reliable, because behavior is already infected with the 
inequities in the prevailing distribution of wealth. Meanwhile, it will take con-
siderable intellectual subtlety for the respondent to understand the differences 
between willingness to pay and willingness to accept payment, between consumer 
and citizen uses of dollars, between option, existence, and bequest values, 
between hypothetical and actual markets, to say nothing of reliably attaching 
dollar amounts to these issues. It is fortunate that most visitors to wildernesses, 
where these surveys are usually conducted, are college educated! 
The wilderness purist thinks the procedure is profane; the ethicist protests that 
justice is wholly overlooked. How we treat the environment is not always a matter 
of economics; it is sometimes a matter of conscience. If the psychiatrist Jung is 
right, some of our emotions toward the land rise out of the collective unconscious; 
yet we are asked to price them in a few minutes. In psychology, advocates of 
values clarification argue that we have not identified a person's values until we 
find options he or she has chosen (1) freely (2) from genuine alternatives (3) after 
reflection, understanding the outcomes. The person must (4) remain satisfied with 
the choices, (5) be willing to advocate them publicly, and (6) act upon them (7) 
repeatedly. Not one of these criteria is satisfied here. 
The admission-price-to-nature question could hardly have been asked in any 
earlier century or in a nonindustrial country, being the product of an economy 
biased toward production maximizing dollars. The mentality of the methodology 
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by which we seek a solution is what created the problem, decimating the wilds. 
"Where will you put your dollars?" is as theory-laden as "Where is your center of 
gravity?" But unlike theories in physics, here we have a valuemp-laden theory that 
already purports to know what counts as costs and benefits. What we want to know 
here (or ought to want to know) are the citizens' convictions about goods in nature 
and their appropriate response to them, their public conscience, and we only 
confuse those we interview when we ask about their desire to pay. The question is 
about principles, not pocketbooks. They are being asked if an ideology is for sale. 
Desire-to-pay questions elsewhere in life are kept carefully separate from what we 
believe to be noble or ignoble behavior. The cash question is incompatible with 
answers of breadth. To insist on pricing is to insist on a category mistake ("the gold 
standard") where attitudes are inchoate.12 
Advocates and even critics can throw up their hands. They can say that the 
technique is well intended, that there is nothing better, and that we cannot avoid 
running an economy. Some dollar values are better than none at all, for otherwise 
these intangible values get lost in the midst of pressures for economic use. 
Especially as the technique has been lately refined, the results significantly aid 
wilderness preservation. Environmentalists can fight fire with fire and prevent the 
burning of their wildlands on the altar of progress. Perhaps. But (to change the 
figure) a philosopher hates to fly in a conceptually flawed airplane, even though 
for the time being it is pragmatically flying in the right direction. If the model is a 
muddle but we use it anyway, being unwilling to face its fallacious reductionism, 
we are disinclined to admit the complexities of the real world and to look for truth 
in likelier directions. 
III. WILD DECISION RULES 
We do not want to play the game by the old rules, but to rewrite the rules. The 
point of my narration of levels and types of value (section one) was to display a 
richer value spectrum than we have reason to believe can be caught by economic 
valuation (section two). Can we say anything positively (section three) to order 
decisions? These principles will not constitute a procedural set. Like a compass, 
they will orient general directions of travel. Specific paths will have to be figured 
out locally. The rules will only begin to map some presently wild terrain. But they 
will be more dependable for discovering and protecting wildland values than 
economic reductions, which as we just found normally lead us astray. 
(1) Use an axiological model. A diagrammatic schema (figure 1) should guide 
policy decisions on remnant U.S. wildlands in the contiguous United States. It is 
applied elsewhere (abroad, Alaska, outside environmental ethics) at your own 
risk. Above the line is a humanistic sequence, below it is a naturalistic sequence. 
    12 M. Sagoff, "At the Shrine of Our Lady of Fatima, or Why Political Questions Are Not All 










Fig. 1. An ordering of levels of value. 
Social goods ordinarily override (>) social preferences, although the latter 
routinely produce (    )  such goods. In turn, this combination overrides 
individual goods, though these feed and determine social preferences, which 
reciprocally also promote (     ) individual goods. A caveat, the small wedge 
checking the larger one,       specifies that some individual goods, few but 
crucial, veto some social preferences. Murder is not justified to obtain 
wilderness, even supposing society preferred this. Individual goods trump those 
individual preferences which commonly produce them. Individual preferences are 
what produce (  ) market prices, and the existence of a market produces in turn   
(  ) the satisfaction of individual preferences so that there is a two-way arrow 
(        ). 
On remaining wildlands, all this valuing overrides market value. The social 
drama is superimposed on the underlying ecosystem, and the diagram suggests the 
shrunken wild domain. Organismic value, as a populational form of life (e.g., 
endangered species, not individuals) ordinarily trumps what (usually minor) social 
or personal goods compete with it, though organisms ordinarily contribute social 
values. Pileated woodpeckers are good in themselves and also enrich human 
experience. Ecosystemic value is more basic than the life-form level, though 
biosystems are naturally selected to interfit  (      ) the two. Both contribute to serial 
human goods. 
The diagram yields prima facie rules. For exceptions, the burden of proof is on 
the dissenter. On remnant wildlands the odds are that the sacrifice of wild values 
will not both contribute to long-term human goods and be justified. The wilder and 
rarer the land, the lower the probability that any consumptive economic use will 
override other values. Virgin forests will stay intact. The demand for wilderness is 
increasing quite as rapidly as the demand for timber; although the latter can be 
satisfied on private lands, the former cannot.  
I am advocating a kind of maxi-min principle following the ratio of continental 
domestication to wildness so that a minimum level (2 percent, 4 percent) of 
wildland values (intrinsic and human instrumental) is maximized (at 98-2, 96-4 
odds), opposing a maxi-max principle (maximum consumption increasing from 96 
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percent to 98 percent to 100 percent our available acreage to raise our already high 
standards of living). That two to four percent surfeit is a "consumers' surplus" we 
do not need. It is a few more pounds on already fat people, who need the rigorous 
leanness that disciplined exposure to wilderness can give. Considering probable 
economic productivity, rather than acreage, there is no reason to think that on 
average U.S. citizens would be even one percent better off if all wildlands were 
sacrificed. From this viewpoint the odds are 99-1 that the sacrifice of wildness 
makes sense in order to achieve economic gain at the cost of values 2-12 lost. 
The areas richest in resources have long since been domesticated and sacrificing 
the remaining wildlands is scraping the bottom of the barrel, a matter of diminish-
ing marginal returns (notwithstanding newly developed technologies), although 
from other points of view the destruction of noneconomic value would be enor-
mous. Public lands, often left over from the public domain in the West or 
reacquired after marginal use in the East, tend not to be economically productive in 
agriculture, timber, or minerals. 
(2) Maximize noncompeting value types. The twelve types of natural value are 
incommensurable, but are also largely noncompeting in all cases but the first. 
Although they cannot be commensurated, they do not have to be. There is no 
translation unit by which A + B - C = D. Genetic diversity (indicated by species 
counts, low extinction rates) cannot meaningfully be added to, or subtracted from, 
recreational benefits (visitor days). But we can easily add together and simul-
taneously enjoy multiple noncompeting incommensurables. Historical, character-
building, or therapeutic uses of wildlands will seldom interfere with scientific and 
religious uses, and nowhere are science and religion more congenial than here. 
The cultural value carried by eagles requires the preservation of a flourishing wild 
population. Aesthetic uses (measured on preference scales) do not upset the life 
support value (indexed by energy flow?) in an ecosystem. So we are not forced to 
prefer only one value. The commensurability of values is, thus far, a pseudoprob-
lem, because these nonconsumptive values reinforce and need not be traded off 
against each other.13 They do not use up wilderness in the ordinary resource sense 
at all,  making it into  something different  from what  it spontaneously was. 
    13 Some counterexamples: Sioux and Cheyenne Indians lost a legal bid to halt recreational develop-
ment at Bear Butte State Park in the Black Hills, a conflict of religion with recreational value; other 
kinds of recreation would have been nonrival. In a Maine referendum on moose hunting, the aesthetic, 
recreational, cultural symbolization (the state animal) values of environmentalists, as well as their 
respect for intrinsic organismic value, clashed with the differing recreational, aesthetic, character-
building, and historical values of the hunters. In Florida, fishermen sought, unsuccessfully, to have the 
park service relax restrictions on fishing in the Everglades, restrictions protecting the endangered 
crocodile. The Defenders of Wildlife protested regulations which allow the twilight shooting of game 
birds, on grounds that low visibility makes it difficult to distinguish common from endangered species. 
These involve clashes of forms of recreational value with scientific, genetic diversity, organismic, 
ecosystemic, and alternate forms of recreational value. But such conflicts are minimal beside economic 
conflicts on wildlands. Though they are not handled by the rules proposed here, willingness-to-pay 
surveys are even more irrelevant. 
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Only economic uses tend to consume wildlands. The question faced here is not 
whether the past economic reduction of the continent was justified, but whether it 
is enough. How much more of the goods (valuesip, sg) we already amply have 
(fiber, timber, energy) can we obtain by consuming the surviving wildlands, and 
do we want these as economic benefits (valuemp) by trading away the noncon-
sumptive set of values? Although this seems to pit market value against some or all 
of values 2-12, for a wider public it only pits a little more extracted from the 2 
percent wild (the 4 percent half wild) of what we have extracted already from the 
98 percent (96 percent) in impressive amounts. Yet this "more" could as easily and 
efficiently be extracted from nonwild lands, which are far and away already the 
richest ones economically. If we ask who are the chief beneficiaries (a few 
operators, perhaps more workers) and who are the trickle-down beneficiaries (the 
public), we may find that this gains a few concentrated, short-term valuesip, ig 
(profits, jobs perhaps unobtainable elsewhere) traded against valuessg and diluted 
but extremely widespread, long-term valueip (recreational benefits, religious 
experiences). Do we have enough consumption? If more is needed, need it come 
by sacrificing wildlands? 
On remaining wildlands, economic use is typically consumptive, and that gives 
preferential treatment to one class of users and uses (value type 1) at the cost of 
depriving other users of their alternate uses (value types 2-12). The nearest that 
policy can come to nonpreferential treatment is by nonconsumptive use. Everyone 
can use wildlands, but no one ought be allowed to use them up. Sometimes 
disparagingly called a "lockup" use, that use treats all users alike, even though 
(indeed, just because) the would-be economic user is prohibited from "takeover" 
use. "Lockup" only prevents "takeover." It is more likely to result in gradually 
unlocking an equal distribution of benefits of the other types over time. It 
simultaneously protects organismic and ecosystemic value, leaving wildlands in a 
spontaneous natural state. 
If basic needs were at stake, or if the continent were not already 98 percent 
developed and developable, this might be unjustly prohibitive. But it is not unjust 
on the last 2 percent, where only more of already abundantly possessed goods is at 
stake. While any economic use is somewhat consumptive, since it sacrifices 
primordial wildness to some degree, some economic uses are more consumptive 
than others. A clear-cut takes the forest out of other uses for a century, and the 
second-growth forest is never the equal of the virgin forest. A cut by selection 
leaves half the original wildness and may only halfway destroy values 2-12. 
Beyond this, however, values of the sort here defended tend not to aggregate 
additively, even when noncompeting. They integrate into a gestalt in which a 
calculus is irrelevant. A single value change may throw the whole pattern into a 
different light. Colored floodlights on Old Faithful, illuminating it for night 
viewing, would add tourist revenue, and yet break the picture of wildness for most 
park visitors. A small-scale, out-of-sight logging operation returns economic 
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benefits; while the noise of the chainsaw carried around the valley may subtract 
only a little from the solitude of some wilderness travelers, it destroys it entirely 
for others. Various-thresholds of perception and value experience are crossed, 
which are not incorporated in aggregating procedures. 
(3) Keep remaining public midlands off the market. The military, police, 
courts, schools, museums, churches, scientific societies, historical parks—all 
cost money and have budgets, but are not businesses expected to produce income 
in any cost-efficient sense, not even when they capture (by fees, admission 
charges, or contributions) part of the value of their services. Though we some 
times decide how much they are worth in dollars, their purposes are to produce 
nonmonetary values. Wildness costs something to preserve, though only the 
minutest fraction of what these other social activities cost. Costs are largely 
opportunity costs forgone, so far as these cannot be achieved on the 98 percent of 
the continent on the market. 
Even on semiwild lands, it is a category mistake to compare market efficiency in 
a Weyerhaeuser timber tract with a national forest. Where national forests are 
quasi-market operations, and little more, they should be sold or leased to private 
entrepreneurs, who will operate them better. On truly "national" forests we protect 
other values, and here market-style questions are awkward because what we want 
on wildlands is what the market never sells—a hiking trail, a trout stream, a scenic 
view, a wilderness experience. No one invests in land to lease it for bird watching 
or butterfly collecting. That is economic nonsense. The purpose of public wild-
lands is to provide benefits that we cannot expect on the market. 
The point of a value analysis should not be to translate all or as much as possible 
of values 2-12 or levels 1-7 into an economic common denominator, but to 
display the wide spectrum of types and levels and give decision makers and  
citizens a strengthened persuasion where these really do (or do not), in aggregate 
or gestalt, beat economic considerations on the fractional remaining wildlands. 
We want a policy to protect these value dimensions not because they are covert 
economic values, but because they are not economic values at all. 
(4) Do not use remaining wildlands nonrenewably or consumptively to satisfy 
the basic needs of a minority in society. The way to feed the hungry is by a 
redistribution of produce from lands in private hands, not by further exploitation of 
the fractional public wildlands. Very few will be put permanently to work by 
wildland exploitation, and these can surely as well be employed elsewhere in the 
enormous American economy. In a free economy, left otherwise unchanged, it is 
impossible to assure that the benefits from sacrificing wildlands will go to the 
poor; indeed, they probably will not. What the disadvantaged (or the middle or 
upper class) think about trading wildland values  to  help the disadvantaged be 
comes irrelevant when  considered apart from whether in the prevailing economy 
this transfer can reliably be expected to take place. 
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Nor will the individual economic gains of the poor (valuejg, mp) overcome the 
social losses (valuesg) in value types 2-12. Poverty problems should be solved 
where they arise: in the mainstream economic sector, not on wildlands. To pit the 
trivial pleasures of an elite (a few fit, wealthy backpackers) against the needs of the 
many (starving in the ghettos) is confused. While such a choice may not be 
spurious in underdeveloped nations, it is in the United States, to which this 
analysis is applied. Even elsewhere, unjust social structures will often prevent 
goods obtained by sacrificing wildlands from benefiting the poor in any long-term 
way. It is everywhere futile to sacrifice wildlands to benefit the disadvantaged 
unless the social structures are just enough to make it probable that this transfer 
will take place. Failing that, the issue is a smokescreen which merely protects 
vested interests; it sacrifices almost every kind of value type and level only to delay 
needed social reforms, keeping in place a social disvalue. The basic needs of all 
can be met, and would already be, if the system were just. Social injustice, 
condoned, does not justify destroying natural values, as yet unappreciated. 
(5) Increase options. By this we increase our possibilities to actualize prefer- 
ences (valueip) and so increase freedom and the quality of life. Most Americans are 
oversupplied with market artifacts and undersupplied with sites for experiencing 
pristine nature. They live in an urban or rural environment 99 percent of their time, 
in a wild environment 1 percent or less. We should, therefore, manage wildlands 
to meet needs that are unmet and unmeetable elsewhere (desires for a temporary 
exit from society or to see bighorn sheep). This is more true when these needs are 
intense, even in a minority, and if society's meeting these needs involves doing 
little or nothing. Also, there is truth in the adage that one should manage for the 
specialized user (the fly fisherman, the backpacker) rather than the general 
user (the picnicker, car camper), since it is likely that the interests of the former 
will be keener, resulting in higher quality experiences for which there are no 
substitutes. Economic uses that consume wildlands destroy our liberties here. 
Although society as a whole should increase all sorts of options, in remnant 
wildland decisions we increase options in wildness alike for ourselves and future 
generations. The pluralist model of "multiple use" here means such multiple 
uses as are noncompeting and nonconsumptive. Competitive and consumptive 
use is provided for elsewhere in the market sector. All this optimizes social 
diversity. 
(6) Make explicit the latent value judgments in quantitative models. The 
numbers look hard—11,176 visitor days, $4,175,000 timber sales, willingness to 
pay $2.32 per person, discount rate 6.7 percent, preference 7.3 (scale of 10) in age 
group 25-35, with 12+ years of education. Although some will say that quanti- 
fication makes values explicit, remember that the numbers are no harder than the 
theories out of which they come, as limited as the concepts which generate them. 
Unless the theories and concepts are explored and remain visible in the discussion, 
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the numbers can deceive. All numbers in science are theory-laden, in environmen-
tal and social science often laden with soft theories. When used to persuade, they 
arise from value-laden theories. They contain large empirical margins of error and 
value judgments that need to be made manifest. To take visitor days as a value 
indicator concentrates on the valueip level, value type 3, and leaves unanalyzed all 
other levels and types. To use any discount rate prefers the present over future 
generations. 
Quantitative techniques, when ineptly or mechanically used, can obscure im-
portant value relations, and even when used at their best can never substitute for 
judgment, intuition, scope of understanding, and verbal assessment. Only the 
latter skills can suggest, at the start, what values are worth quantifying and how to 
try to quantify them, and in the end, only the latter can interpret the numbers that 
emerge. Dollar signs give the impression that a host of problems have been 
overcome interrelating valuesg to valuemp. The "number values," nevertheless, are 
meaningless except in the context of an interpreted narrative of values. Numbers 
may disguise, rather than expose, value judgments. Indeed, the numbers are 
sometimes little more than tropes, used for the sake of giving life or emphasis to an 
idea. They are used in a different sense from the way numbers are usually used, not 
to count empirical things exactly at all, but only symbolically to stand for values 
when they are felt to be real but the amount present, though important, is 
unverifiable. We should distrust any numbers for which there is only one indica-
tor, since there is no cross-checking and the cramped value judgments are less easy 
to expose. 
In the end, wildland decisions are not a data-driven process; rather the data is 
caged by a value-driven theory. The data seldom changes anyone's mind, but is 
gathered and selected to justify positions already held, and ignored or reinterpreted 
if it is in conflict with favored positions. We should decide first about the latent 
ideology, only secondarily about the number analysis. 
(7) Protect minority interests, especially where this is nonconsumptive and 
requires doing nothing. Consumptive minority interests, especially if they require 
expensive action (building a road to keep a local mill going) should not override 
nonconsumptive majority interests. On the other hand, nonconsumptive minority 
interests (mountaineering, bird watching) which can be satisfied by doing almost 
nothing are cheap and easy to protect and are noncompeting between values 2-12. 
The protection of such minority interests is a long-standing majoritarian American 
value. Nothing is actually taken away from the majority in protecting these 
interests, although opportunity costs may be forgone. These may be significant to 
a few, but are not likely to be great to the community as a whole. 
Opportunity costs forgone (valuemp) make sense as real social costs (valuesg) 
only when these opportunities are available only on the site in question. From the 
perspective of valuesg, the timber lost on a wilderness site is no irretrievable 
disvalue if by better management  techniques an equal amount might have been 
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grown elsewhere, although managers are too inefficient or uninterested to attempt 
this.14 Similarly, in assessing the costs of the Cranberry Wilderness in West 
Virginia at $30.77 per visitor day, it makes little sense to count as by far the largest 
factor $223,609 per year in opportunity costs of coal left underground and 
unmined, since there is a three-hundred-year supply of coal elsewhere in the 
Appalachian coal strata, and no reason to think the Cranberry coal should be mined 
soon or needs to be in order to meet national needs.15 Nor should one forget, when 
development takes place and these opportunity costs become dollar benefits 
instead, that a spectrum of other opportunity costs (values 2-12) appears, opportu-
nities lost perhaps forever. 
Any delay, moreover, brings opportunity to see whether even the majority do 
not gain in values 2-12 more than they lose in opportunity costs. We gain benefits 
for the minority and the benefits of waiting for the majority. This rule protects 
against a danger in what otherwise seems so democratic—settling things by 
referendum. One purpose of government is to see that the fully considered will of 
the majority is done, where there is no injustice; another is to see that this is not 
imposed on the minority unjustly. A strategy for insuring this might be, for 
instance, to prefer nonconsumptive minority interests over consumptive simple 
majority interests and, furthermore, to require a two-thirds majority, on grounds 
that consumptive use of relict wildlands requires more caution and a quite un-
equivocal demonstration that this is in fact the considered majority view—that it is 
a use worth imposing at irreversible sacrifice on the minority and with irreversible 
loss of option to the majority. 
Policy here should favor nonconsumptive minority interests over consumptive 
minority interests, since those who want to "lock up" the land delay but do not 
irrevocably destroy the option of developing it, while developers who "use up" the 
land irrevocably erode the original set of wild values carried by it. 
(8) Do not underestimate diffused values. Although lots of persons may be hurt 
by a decision, they are not hurt very much (a diminished vacation vista), while a 
few (the mill operators who clearcut) have a lot to gain. We can expect the latter to 
lobby full force; the former, however, will be disorganized, slow to realize what is 
at stake, and ill-represented in the public participation process. Yet, the aggregate 
loss of value—now to the majority—can be much larger than the gain to the 
minority. The scenery is marred for a century. Even when the amenity values are 
accurately represented, they are intangible. 
  14  Julie F. Gorte and W. Wendell Fletcher, analysts for the Office of Technology Assessment, find 
that simple management practices (such as thinning) on only 30-40% of the U.S. commercial 
forestland base could double the current harvest levels, and at the current levels Americans already 
consume more wood than people in any other nation. "Technology, Timber and the Future," Renew-
able Resources Journal 2, nos. 2 & 3 (Autumn 1983 & Winter 1984): 16-19. 
15 W. Guldin, "Predicting Costs of Eastern National Forest Wilderness," Journal of Leisure 
Research 13 (1981): 112-28. 
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Sometimes the agenda can determine the result. The hard values, considered 
first, are thoroughly assessed; the soft values, held in abeyance to be considered 
last, are only loosely (and wearily) thrown in, after the hard values are already 
massively in place. If the agenda is the other way round, with as much attention 
given to specifying the soft values, and only afterward considering whether 
economic benefits override these, the results could be different. The path by which 
the choice is made can bias the choice. 
All this tends to stunt the attention given to soft values, that is, to underrepresent 
the widespread, low-level intangibles and overestimate the concentrated, intense 
tangibles. Even the use of willingness to pay, well-intended though it is, routinely 
underappraises the soft values, for reasons we have examined. Moreover, one 
needs to identify the changes in value distribution over different populations, 
always an ethically relevant consideration even beyond aggregates, to avoid 
unjustly benefiting the few while burdening the many. 
Some contend that a preservationist policy imposes concentrated costs (the few, 
local timber companies who lose a lot) and diffuse benefits (the public, who gain 
slight recreational benefits). Such policy is rarely implemented not only because it 
is difficult to maintain legislatively, but even more because it is ethically unsatis-
factory. The better gestalt is to turn the picture around and say that a development 
policy, at least on relict wildlands, permits concentrated benefits (the timber 
sellers and buyers) and diffuse costs (intangibles over a larger public). The latter is 
the more logical and ethical gestalt, because the public, which is the present owner 
and has its benefits of wildness taken away, is the loser. The timber operators, who 
do not now own the timber but who buy it for profit, are the gainers. 
Furthermore, if the timber companies do not pay the full costs, or if they destroy 
what money cannot buy, then they (and their customers) are subsidized at the 
public loss, a situation which is even more ethically unsatisfactory. The ideal in a 
democracy is for the majority to have their well-considered way, provided there is 
no injustice to the minority, and provided that there is a full counting of the 
production and distribution costs and benefits. The concept of opportunity costs 
forgone should not be applied to minority would-be exploiters of the land, who are 
not now its owners, but to the present owners, the public. If this public uses 
wildlands as one kind of resource and it cannot simultaneously use them as another 
kind of resource, it must consider its opportunity costs forgone, especially if such 
opportunities cannot be had elsewhere. But opportunity costs forgone need not 
apply to consumptive opportunists on public lands. That is why we should not pit 
concentrated costs against diffuse benefits, but turn the issue around and pit 
concentrated benefits against diffuse costs. 
(9) Recognize that wildland decisions must be one place where the model 
(myth?) of the perpetually expanding economy is broken. Four hundred and fifty 
years ago Europeans began to enter what they naively called an empty continent. 
Abetted by the industrial revolution in the last two hundred years and the explosion 
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of science and technology in the last hundred, the American economy has been on 
a growth trip unprecedented in the history of the world. A national tradition 
conflicts with the preservation of wildland values. Many people cry, "More!" 
Wildland managers, aside from the natural values they positively protect, nega-
tively have to say, "Enough!" It will always be possible to increase the GNP a bit 
by sacrificing wildlands. But now is the time, here is the place, to draw the line at 
the boundaries of the wildland remnants and say: this far, but no farther with the 
expanding economy. 
Expand it, if you must, on nonwild lands. It is futile to sacrifice the relict 
wildlands and to confront the collapsing growth myth only after they are gone. To 
confront it now saves so much in values 2-12. This policy also helps us anticipate 
the steady-state economy and not tumble into it by default and catastrophe. We 
have no reason to think that the last fraction exploited will leave us any nearer to 
satisfied consumer desires in a system designed ever to escalate those desires. 
Americans are already rich and need to learn when enough is enough. In this sense, 
wildland decisions are not peripheral "recreational" matters but frontline chal-
lenges to a governing paradigm. Wildland managers are not simply supplying 
values additionally to those generated in the domestic economy; they are confront-
ing the slowdown, and, at wildland boundaries, the breakdown of a traditional 
economy in favor of noneconomic values. Wildland decisions are rewriting 
history, terminating and reevaluating the transcontinental growth trip. At the 
wilderness boundary, we should post a sign: "Enter the wilderness. Abandon the 
GNP rat race here. Learn to be wilderness rich." 
In this context one frequently hears proposals that developers and preservation-
ists ought to meet each other halfway. Compromise is frequently a necessity and 
often moral in policy decisions, but there is no logic by which fairness is always 
meeting each other halfway or by which conflicting values are usually optimized 
by compromise. There is even less reason to believe this in wildland disputes, 
where 98 percent of the continent is developed, 2 percent remains wild, and 
developers propose to preservationists that they should meet halfway over the 
remaining 2 percent. 
(10) Expect wildland decisions to awaken previously latent and newly emerging 
values. Environmental values are among those things until recently taken for 
granted, naively appreciated, or unappreciated. Not until developers threatened 
the mountain on the skyline did we realize what it meant to us. Not until they 
proposed to drain the marsh could we say that we would rather have it left alone, 
and even now it is difficult to articulate why. We never miss the water until the 
well runs dry. We learn what is at stake only when we learn that it is at stake. We 
awaken to goods when their opposites threaten, or awaken to inconsistencies in 
our own value sets when we cannot have our cake and eat it too. In these matters 
we can hardly expect a congressional mandate ever to be as groundbreaking as it 
ought to be, though we can reasonably expect it  to express social preferences over 
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economic interests. One cannot get anything through Congress that is very 
complex or controversial. The earliest growth in value awareness comes some-
where back in the grassroots, but decision models need to help it along. Deciders 
should find the trend, not the mean; they should lead, not just follow. They should 
set principles, not just sum preferences. 
I close with a factual claim and a plea. A trend approximating this axiological 
model (above the solid line) and these rules can be found in congressional 
legislation over the last twenty years (the National Environmental Policy Act; the 
Endangered Species Act, the various Wilderness Acts, the Wild and Scenic Rivers 
Act), usually expressed vaguely as a desire to protect "environmental," "ecologi-
cal," or "amenity" values from economic usurpation. The Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act of 1976 "declares that it is the policy of the United States that" 
there be "a combination of balanced and diverse resource uses . . . without 
permanent impairment of the productivity of the land and the quality of the 
environment with consideration being given to the relative values of the resources 
and not necessarily to the combination of uses that will give the greatest economic 
return."16 
What is novel here is adding the understory of natural value, which, while not 
explicit in the legislation, is permitted by and consistent with it, and more ethically 
advanced (nonanthropocentric) than can yet be expected of congressional legisla-
tion. What we still need is a kind of emancipation proclamation for the wildness 
that remains, which can be issued with the full assurance that the benefits to the 
emancipators will outweigh their costs, with these to be added to the benefits to the 
emancipated (as was true with the Emancipation Proclamation of 1863). This is a 
call for humans to respect the plenitude of being, once so vast and now so quickly 
vanishing, which surrounds us in the wild world. 
Can humans genuinely gain by exploiting the fractional wilds that remain? 
What does it profit to gain the whole world, only to lose it—to gain it economical-
ly, only to lose it scientifically, aesthetically, recreationally, religiously, as a 
wonderland of natural history, as a realm of integral wildness that transcends and 







16 Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (Public Law 94-579), Sees. 102, 103. (90 
STAT. 2743) There is similar language in the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960 (Public Law 
86-517), Sec. 4(a). (74 STAT. 215) 
